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FOURTH AMENDMENT-AIRPORT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: WHERE WILL
THE COURT LAND?
United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).
Reid v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 2752 (1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court in the preceeding term once
again took up the issue of Terry stops.' The Court
placed in a new context its application of the fourth
amendment 2 standard of reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, but did not necessarily expand
its interpretation of that standard.3
In United States v. Mendenhall,4 the Court upheld
the stop of an airline passenger by DEA5 agents
and a subsequent consent search that uncovered
heroin. The majority divided on whether the initial
stop was a seizure; two of the Justices maintained
that no seizure took place, while the other three
assumed the stop to be a seizure supported by a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.6 All five
I Ten9y stops are stops of citizens by law enforcement
officers for informational or investigatory purposes. They
were first recognized by the Supreme Court in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), from which the name is derived.
2 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, .... U.S. CONsT. amend.
IV.
3 The Court is applying the standard of reasonable
suspicion to more types of police-citizen encounters. The
application of the standard is expansive. However, the
Court is making the government's task of showing rea-
sonable suspicion more difficult. In other words, the
Court appears increasingly willing to apply the standard
and increasingly unwilling to find the standard satisfied
by the government's proof.
4 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).
5 Drug Enforcement Administration. Agents are sta-
tioned at major airports to observe arriving passengers
for drug courier-related characteristics. This is part of a
nationwide program in existence since 1974 to intercept
narcotics couriers transporting their contraband between
the major drug producing cities and the major drug
distribution centers via the airlines. United States v.
Mendenhall, Id. at 1881.6 Justices Stewart and Rehnquist believed there was
no seizure, and Justices Powell and Blackmun along with
Chief Justice Burger believed the seizure to be justified
by reasonable suspicion.
joined in finding an effective consent to search.
Mendenhall represented the first time the Supreme
Court upheld the conviction of an individual for
narcotics possession when the officer seizing the
evidence had acted on less than probable cause.9
In Reid v. Georgia,'0 the Court never reached the
question of consent. A majority of the Court held
per curiam that the federal agents did not have a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify
detaining two passengers as they left the terminal,
so their possible "consent" was irrelevant.
The cases taken together do not provide clarity
as to the substance of the standard of reasonable
suspicion. The facts of both cases are similar; the
analysis applied by the Court is similar, yet the
outcomes differ." Mendenhall provided a more ex-
pansive interpretation of what constituted reason-
able suspicion than did Reid.
The Court did not decide the initial stop issue.
Both cases presented the Court with an opportu-
nity to finally decide when a stop by an officer
constitutes a seizure. Although in Mendenhall more
is written on this issue than on any other, the Court
provided no set guidelines. It sidestepped the issue,
with the likely result being continued uncertainty
and confusion in the courts below.
The one clear aspect of both cases is that the
standard of reasonable suspicion,12 an outgrowth
7 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1880.
In neither Mendenhall nor in Reid did the government
claim probable cause led to the stops. Neither was prob-
able cause alleged for the search in Mendenhall.
9 In Ybarra v. Illinois, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979), the Court
struck down the conviction of Ybarra based on narcotics
seized by an officer during a weapons frisk.
t0 100 S. Ct. 2752 (1980).
" United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1876;
Reid v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. at 2753.
12 The reasonable suspicion standard was not labeled
as such in Terry. The Terry Court denoted the standard
with the phrase "reason to conclude in light of his expe-
rience that criminal activity is afoot." Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. at 30.
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of Terry v. Ohio,'3 has been accepted by all members
of the Court as the standard to use to determine
whether a seizure was reasonable and therefore
justified. Prior to Terry, the rights guaranteed by
the fourth amendment 4 were protected by the
standard of probable cause.' 5 The judicially fa-
vored way of ensuring that the government did not
intrude unnecessarily on the privacy of its citizens
was to require that a warrant be obtained from a
magistrate prior to the intrusion.16 Over the years,
exceptions to the general requirement of a warrant
have been accepted.' 7 Terry was such an exception.
13 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, a policeman approached
three men whom he believed, based upon his observa-
tions, to be casing a store for a robbery, and asked for
their names. When he received only a mumbled response,
and because he believed the men to be armed and
dangerous, the officer grabbed the petitioner, spun him
around, and patted him down, finding a gun.
14 "The basic purpose of the amendment
... recognized in countless decisions of this. Court is to
safeguard the privacy and the security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. The
Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a
right of the people which is 'based on a free society.'"
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
Another essential purpose is to require that a standard of
reasonableness be applied to the exercise of discretion by
governmental officials. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
650, 653-54 (1979); accord, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 312 (1978). See generally O'Brien, Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy: Principles and Politics of Fourth Amend-
ment Protected Privacy, 13 Naw ENO. L. R v. 662 (1978).
is 100 S. Ct. at 1875. Probable cause is determined by
deciding "whether at that moment [when an arrest oc-
curs] the facts and circumstances within [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the petitioner had committed or was com-
mitting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1924).
16 "It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth
amendments that a search conducted without a warrant
issued upon probable cause is 'per se unreasonable ... '
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
"We do not retreat from our holdings that the police
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial ap-
proval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure,...." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20; see Beck
v. Ohio, 397 U.S. at 96; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 356-57 (1967). See also Note, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte:
The Question of Noncustodial and Custodial Consent Searches, 66
J. CRIM. L. & C. 286, 286 (1975).
17 A search without a warrant is not unreasonable if it
falls within a recognized exception. The exceptions de-
veloped out of the belief that in some instances it was
more reasonable for a law enforcement agent to take
action without obtaining a warrant first. Some of the
established exceptions include searches and seizures in-
cident to a valid arrest, see United States v. Chadwick,
The Court in Terry realized that in certain situa-
tions intrusions of a lesser nature than an arrest
were necessary for the well-being of the public and
the police officer. 18 Since the intrusions were less
severe than an arrest, the standard to justify them
could be less demanding than probable cause.'
9
A reasonable suspicion of criminal activity has
evolved into the lesser standard. This le-ser stan-
dard is now denoted by the phrase "a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity." The standard is
based on two sources of information that when
added together must cause a reasonable man to
believe that the action taken was proper: 2° I) the
"specific and articulable facts" known to the offi-
cer, and 2) any inferences the officer could reason-
ably draw from those facts in light of his experience
as an officer.2' The scope of the intrusion is limited
by the justification produced by the initial deter-
mination of reasonableness.22 The Court applied
this standard in Reid and Mendenhall.
433 U.S. 1, 14 (1977); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
768 (1969); inventory searches of automobiles held at
police stations, see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 370-71 (1976); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62
(1967); seizures of items in plain view when the seizing
officer has a right to be at the place where the item can
be seen, see Air Pollution Control Bd. v. Western Alfalfa
Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974); Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 43 (1963); seizures to prevent possible escape or
the destruction of evidence, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 394 (1978); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
298 (1967); consent searches, see Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. at 222; Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543, 548 (1968); searches by customs officials, see
United States v. Ramsey, 413 U.S. 606, 616 (1977); and
searches or seizures while in hot pursuit, see Warren v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 24.
'9The Court recognized that the fourth amendment
extended to ensure the privacy of persons on the street
from unreasonable intrusions by government agents.,Id.
at 9. However, because often it would be impractical or
impossible for an officer reacting to.spontaneous situa-
iions on the street to obtain a warrant, and because many
of the encounters on the street were of a lesser nature tot
requiring a warrant, such actions by an officer were not
to be judged by the warrant clause of the fourth amend-
ment. Instead, they were to be judged by the reasonable-
ness of the action. Id. at 20.
20 Id. at 20.
21 Id. at 21. This standard is applied to the two tiers:
the initial intrusion and the scope of the intrusion, both
recognized in Terry.
2 Id. at 21. The officer in Terry was justified in frisking
the individual when he had reason to believe the individ-
ual was armed and dangerous. The justification was
safety of the officer and the public. The scope of the
intrusion was limited to a patting of the outer clothing
for weapons. Id. at 28-30.
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II. UNITED STATES V. MENDENHALL
Sylvia Mendenhall landed at the Detroit Met-
ropolitan Airport to switch planes on her flight
from Los Angeles to Pittsburgh. She was the last
passenger off the plane. Two DEA agents watched
her scan the terminal and then proceed slowly to
the baggage area. Instead of claiming any baggage,
she asked an airline employee for the location of
the Eastern Airlines ticket counter. She then pro-
ceeded to that counter to pick up her boarding
pass for her flight to Pittsburgh.23
As Mendenhall walked through the terminal the
agents approached her, identified themselves as
federal agents, and asked her for some identifica-
tion. She gave them her driver's license, but the
name on it did not match the name on her airline
ticket. She gave them no explanation other than
that she felt like using another name. She also told
the agents, upon questioning, that she had been in
Los Angeles two days.
One agent then identified himself as a federal
narcotics agent, at which point Mendenhall ap-
peared to become quite nervous. After returning
the license and the ticket, the agent asked Menden-
hall if she would accompany him to the DEA office
in the airport. She did so.U At the DEA office the
agent asked her if she would consent to a search of
her purse and her person, and told her that she
could refuse. She said, "Go ahead." A female officer
arrived to conduct the body search. She too asked
Mendenhall if she consented and told her again
that she could refuse. Mendenhall still consented.
The officer then told her to remove her clothes.
Mendenhall hesitated and mentioned that she had
a plane to catch. When the officer assured her that
she would make the flight if the search turned up
no narcotics, she began to undress, and removed
heroin from her undergarments.2
Mendenhall was charged with possessing heroin
with intent to distribute.26 The district court denied
23 The dissent indicates that Mendenhall went to the
Eastern counter to pick up her boarding pass, not to buy
a new ticket. United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at
1887.
2' The record provided no indication of her consent,
only that she had gone with the agents. Id. at 1874.
"Id. at 1873-74.
2 Although the Court does not set out the specific
statute under which the respondent was convicted, the
applicable statute is probably 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(1970): "(a) except as authorized by this subchapter, it
will be unlawful for any person knowingly or intention-
ally (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess
with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a
controlled substance; .... "
her motion to suppress the evidence obtained dur-
ing the body search as the product of an unlawful
search and seizure.27 It concluded that the agents'
approach constituted a valid investigatory stop,
that the respondent voluntarily went to the DEA
office with the agents so that no arrest occurred at
that time, and that respondent had consented to
the search.ss
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
based solely on its prior decision in United States v.
McCaleb,29 a factually similar case.3° A rehearing en
banc resulted in the same conclusion.
3 1
Justice Stewart wrote the five-member majority
opinion reversing the court of appeals' decision.
AMcording to him, three issues were presented for
determination: whether the initial stop of Menden-
hall by the agents constituted a seizure, whether
Mendenhall voluntarily consented to accompany
the agents to their office, and whether Mendenhall
freely and voluntarily consented to the body
search.2
The majority of the Court upheld the initial stop
as valid, but for different reasons. For Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist, the stop did not constitute
a seizure, so the determination of reasonable sus-
2 The district court's opinion has not been reported.
28 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1874.
9 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir.), rehearing en banc, 556 F.2d
385 (1977). In McCaleb, the court held that reasonable
suspicion to stop was not present when the only infor-
mation upon which the stop was based was the compar-
ison of defendant's behavior with the drug courier profile.
Id. at 720. It also held that asking the defendant to
accompany the agents to the DEA office constituted an
arrest. Id. Finally, the court ruled the consent invalid
because it was the "fruit" of an unconstitutional deten-
tion. Id. at 721.
For cases holding that in such a situation no arrest
occurred, see United States v. Chapman, 573 F.2d 565,
567 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45,
57 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Salter, 521 F.2d 1326,
1328-29 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Richards, 500
F.2d 1025, 1027-29 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
924 (1975).
30 The broad facts are similar. The defendants were
observed by DEA agents, and their behavior coincided
with the airport's drug courier profile. The agents ap-
proached the defendants, asked them a few questions,
and then asked the defendants to accompany them to the
DEA office for a search. Id. at 717. There is an important
difference between McCaleb and Mendenhall. Only in Men-
denhall was the suspect told that she could refuse to
consent to the search. The suspects in McCaleb were told
if they did not consent they would be detained while a
search warrant was obtained.
3' United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1875.
32 This division coincided with the issues presented by
the government. See Brief for Petitioner passim, United
States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870.
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picion was unnecessary.33 Justice Powell, along
with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
assumed that the stop constituted a seizure and
held that the seizure was supported by the agents'
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.3 The
dissent likewise viewed the stop as a seizure, but
found no basis for reasonable suspicion.3
5
The majority agreed that Mendenhall voluntar-
ily accompanied the agents to their office and
that, in light of all the circumstances, she had
effectively consented to the search of her purse and
her person.37 The dissent viewed the trip to the
office as a seizure akin to an arrest, therefore
requiring probable cause238 The dissent further
believed that Mendenhall's illegal detention
tainted the evidence found in the search, and
should have resulted in suppression.3
9
Justice Stewart's opinion placed the case within
the confines of the fourth amendment. He noted
that the fourth amendment extended to Menden-
hall its protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures as she walked through the airport. 4°
Before proceeding with his argument, he set out
the government's position, that although Menden-
hall was searched without a warrant or probable
cause, Mendenhall's consent validated the search.
The c-,lrt of appeals, according to Justice Stewart,
mistakenly took the position that Mendenhall's
3 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
4Id. at 1880.
35 Id. at 1886.
36 Id. at 1879.37 Id. at 1880.
38Id. at 1887.
Id. at 1889.40 Id. at 1875. "[Tlhe inestimable right of personal
security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of
our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to
dispose of his secret affairs." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at
8-9. The Court in Terry recognized that all seizures, even
those of a brief duration, are covered by the protections
of the fourth amendment. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 100 S.
Ct. at 342 (public places); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
at 663 (transportation).
How long is brief? Most courts do not set a time limit.
However, often it is viewed as the amount of time it takes
for identification and an explanation for the suspicious
behavior. Van Sicklen, Terry Revisited: Critical Update on
Recent Stop-and-Frisk Developments, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 877,
877 n.1, reprinted in 1 CRIM. L. REv. 147 (1979).
For a case allowing a "brief" detention of two hours,
see United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir.
1954).
The American Law Institute has set twenty minutes
as the time limit for a stop not requiring probable cause
or consent. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PRO-
CEDURE § 110.2(1) at 5.
consent was the product of earlier conduct by the
agents which violated the fourth amendment.
4
1
Following this overview of the parties' positions,
Justice Stewart addressed the issue of whether the
stop of Mendenhall was a seizure.42 He immedi-
ately placed the issue within the confines of the
analysis of Terry v. Ohio, thus implicitly steering it
into the reasonable search and seizure clause of the
fourth amendment.4 3 Terry required the application
of an objective standard to all seizures," but did
not maintain that every contact between an indi-
45
vidual and an officer constituted a seizure.
Justice Stewart turned directly to the facts of
Terry to establish the difference between a seizure
and a mere encounter. He reasoned that since the
Court in Terry did not deal with the initial stop, no
seizure occurred until the officer grabbed the pe-
titioner and restrained him from leaving.4 6 He
41 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1875.42 Justice Stewart at this point was writing only for
himself and Justice Rehnquist.
43 Terry implicitly recognized the dichotomy in the
fourth amendment between the warrant clause and the
reasonable search and seizure clause. The fourth amend-
ment does not forbid all searches and seizures without a
warrant, rather "what the Constitution forbids
is... unreasonable searches and seizures." Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. at 9. See note 19 supra.
44 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1876. Of
course, seizures that equalled an arrest still required
probable cause, and even seizures falling short of an
arrest could require probable cause as the objective stan-
dard to be met. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
216 (1979).
45 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1876.
Justice Stewart drew upon a footnote in Terry.
"[O]bviously not all personal intercourse between police-
men and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when
the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority
has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may
we conclude that a seizure has occurred." Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. at 19 n.16. Prior to the note, the Court had
already recognized that police-citizen encounters are "in-
herently rich in diversity," ranging from friendly conver-
sations to hostile confrontations. Id. at 13.
Many such encounters are susceptible to abuse. These
are known as "aggressive preventive patrol" and include
1) vice control practices, 2) weapons confiscation, 3)
control of gangs and juveniles, 4) disturbance control, 5)
control of public drinking, 6) traffic control. LaFave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters,
and Beyond, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 39, 61-62 (1968).
46 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1876.
Justice Stewart viewed Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968), a companion case of Terry, similarly. In Sibron an
officer observing Sibron most of the day approached him
while he sat in a cafe. The officer asked Sibron to step
outside and Sibron did. Once outside, Sibron reached
[Vol. 71
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accepted the views of Justices White and Harlan,
concurring in Terry, that like any other citizen, an
officer has the right to question anyone he meets.
Conversely, the individual questioned has the right
to ignore the officer's questions just as he would if
any other citizen was questioning him.
47
To bolster his position, Justice Stewart explained
that if all encounters are viewed as seizures, much
contact between police and citizens would be elim-
inated. He reasoned that as long as an individual
is free to walk away, no intrusion upon the individ-
ual's constitutional rights occurs.8 Second, calling
all such encounters seizures would not better pro-
tect any fourth amendment rights, but to the con-
trary would hamper legitimate law enforcement
techniques. 9 He concluded "that a person has been
into his pocket causing the officer to reach in the pocket
also. The pocket contained narcotics, but the search was
ruled unlawful. The Court stated that the record was
bare as to whether Sibron voluntarily accompanied the
officer out of the cafe or did so submitting to a show of
authority by the officer. Id. at 63. Justice Stewart main-
tained that if the latter was a seizure, then the former
must not be a seizure.
47 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1876.
"There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a
policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the
streets." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., con-
curring). The police have the same right as everyone else
to address questions to other persons, but "ordinarily the
person addressed has an equal right to ignore his inter-
rogator and walk away; . Id. at 32-33 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
48 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
"As long as the person to whom questions are put remains
free to disregard the questions and walk away there has
been no intrusion upon a person's liberty or privacy ... 
See note 14 supra.
49 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
Justice Stewart noted that the Court had previously
recognized the effectiveness of police questioning as an
investigative tool, protecting the innocent and appre-
hending the guilty. Without it the "security of all would
be diminished." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at
225; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963).
The discussion provides an example of the balancing
process that determines reasonableness. Justice Stewart
concluded that it was reasonable not to view all intrusions
as seizures because to do so would harm societal interests
without concurrently increasing protection of individual
liberty. In other words, the trade off or compromise was
negative; society lost, but the individual did not gain.
For a general discussion of the inappropriateness of
applying the exclusionary rule to investigatory stops be-
cause other police citizen encounters can be abusive, see
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 12-15.
Other encounters where it is reasonable for an officer
to stop the individual without probable cause include:
individual matches an informant's tip, individual
matches general description provided by a victim or
'seized' within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment only if, in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would believe that he was not free to leave."
' 0
A reasonable belief could arise however, without
the individual being physically restrained from
leaving. Justice Stewart provided several examples
of a seizure without physical restraint, including
the presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, the officer touching the
individual, or the officer using certain language or
a tone of voice indicating a demand for compli-
ance.
5
' He compared these examples to the facts of
the case to conclude that there was no reason for
the respondent to believe that she was not free to
leave when approached by the DEA agents.
52
Justice Stewart then rejected other arguments
raised in support of the Mendenhall encounter being
a seizure. He initially rejected an argument based
on Mendenhall's imputed lack of knowledge. Al-
though Mendenhall did not know she was free to
leave, under the Court's ruling in Schneckloth v.
Bustamontess that knowledge is irrelevant: voluntar-
iness does not depend upon being informed of the
right to refuse. 54 In similar fashion, this time with-
out case support, he rejected the notion that Men-
witness, individual leaving an area where the officer has
been summoned for help, individual carrying an item in
a way that suggests the individual obtained the item
unlawfully, and the individual is with someone arrested
by the officer. LaFave, supra note 45, at 77.
50 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
The government made the same argument. Brief for
Petitioner at 20-21, United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S.
Ct. 1870.
51 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
These examples were listed in the Brief for Petitioner at
25 n.19, United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870.
The petitioner obtained them from 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, A TREATIsE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 9.2 at 54 (1978).52 United 9tates v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1877-78.
Justice Stewart relied upon the following factors to sup-
port his conclusion that there was not a seizure: the
approach occurred in a public place, the agents ap-
proached the respondent rather than summoning her to
them, the agents did not demand, but requested to see
respondent's license and plane ticket. The respondent
was not seized just because she provided her ticket and
license to the agents, nor because the person doing the
asking was a federal agent.
' 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Schneckloth is currently the
leading case on what constitutes an effective consent. For
a discussion of Schneckloth, see Note, supra note 16.
5 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1878.
Knowledge of the right to refuse is only one factor in the
determination of whether the consent was voluntary. It
is not the sine qua non of an effective consent. Schneckloth
19801
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denhall's action against her self-interest was proof
that she had been seized. He noted that the issue
was voluntariness rather than self-protection.5
Third, he distinquished Brown v. Texas,m a case
relied on by Mendenhall. In Brown, a frisk occur-
ring over the suspect's protest constituted a sei-
zure,
57 but in Mendenhall the suspect had consented,
without protesting."s Finally, he dismissed any re-
liance on the cases involving investigatory stops of
automobiles. 59justice Stewart maintained thatjust
because stopping an automobile was a seizure did
not mean that stopping a pedestrian was a seizure,
because stopping a pedestrian was less intrusive
than stopping an automobiler'
After dismissing Mendenhall's seizure argu-
ments, Justice Stewart, now with a majority of the
Court, dealt with the second issue-whether Men-
denhall consented to accompany the agents to the
DEA office. He began by chastising the court of
appeals for substituting its view of the evidence for
that of the district court when the latter's view was
supported by the record.6 ' The majority agreed
with the district court that the respondent had
consented to go the the DEA office, and that her
consent was voluntary. 6 The fact that she was
asked to go to the DEA office, rather than ordered,
that there was no show of force, that she had been
detained only briefly prior to being asked, and that
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227.
s United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1878. It
does not matter if an individual makes a statement he
later regrets to an officer, if it was made voluntarily. The
notion that a damaging response cannot be voluntary
was also rejected by the ALL. ALI, MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAICNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.1, at 260.
• 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
57 Id. at 50.
58 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1878.
Respondent did not testify at the hearing. Id. at 1888.
However, it can hardly be maintained that respondent
consented to the initial stop by stopping when ap-
proached by the agents. She would seem to have had no
choice.
"9 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 650 (1979); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
6 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1878.
The distinction is not clear. In both situations a traveler
has his progress impeded so that a law officer can inves-
tigate.
Petitioners had argued that the airport stop was anal-
ogous to the stop in Brignoni-Ponce. Brief for Petitioner at
36-37, United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870.
6' United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1879.
62 Id. at 1879. "[W]hether a consent ... was in fact
voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion,
expressed or implied, is a question of fact to be deter-
mined from the totality of all the circumstances."
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227.
her ticket and license had been returned prior to
being asked carried the day for the government. 6
Demographic factors such as age, education, and
race, tending to invalidate consent, were relevant,
but not determinative.
64
Finally, the majority turned to the last issue-
the consensual body search. As with the previous
issue, the discussion was brief. Initially, Justice
Stewart noted that because the seizure was lawful,
it could not have tainted Mendenhall's consent.65
He cited several reasons for finding that the consent
was freely and voluntarily given.66 One was Men-
denhall's age and education. 67 Another was the
fact that Mendenhall had been told twice by the
very people who were asking her consent that she
did not have to consent.68 Third, Mendenhall had
6 "When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to
justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of
proving that the consent was in fact freely and voluntarily
given." Schenckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222;
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. at 548.
64 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1879.
The consent was not coerced simply because respondent
was twenty-two, black, female, and a high school dropout
confronted by two white male federal agents. Schneckloth
listed factors that have been considered in determining
effective consent: youth, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596
(1948); education, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
(1958); intelligence, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191
(1957); lack of advice on constitutional rights, e.g., Davis
v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); length of deten-
tion, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940);
nature of the questioning, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143 (1944); physical punishment, e.g., Reck v. Pate,
367 U.S. 433 (1961). Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. at 226. No one single criterion emerges from these
cases as controlling. Each case looked at the factual
circumstances, their psychological impact on the individ-
ual, and the legal significance of the individual's reaction.
Id.
as United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1879.
66 Id. at 1879-80.
67 Id. at 1879. She was twenty-two and had an eleventh
grade education.
68 Id. Even though knowledge of the right to refuse was
not the sine qua non of consent, the Court based its decision
upon that knowledge, especially since it was provided by
those seeking the consent. One wonders how effective
such information is when it comes from the very party
seeking consent. Even Justice Stewart admitted that such
things as language used and tone of voice can be coercive.
100 S. Ct. 1277-78. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
Such warnings have been argued as the answer to this
problem. See ALI, MODEL CODE OF PRF-ARRAIONMENT
PROCEDURE § 110.1(2), at 3; § 240.2(2), at 149, 261 &
n. 10, 533-35; LaFave, supra note 45, at 96-99. LaFave set
out the differences between field interrogations and sta-
tion house interrogations. At the station house one is cut
off from the outside world in unfamiliar surroundings,
subjected to longer interrogations, and faced with the
[Vol. 71
AIRPORT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
already unequivocally consented not once, but
twice. Fourth, the statement that she had a plane
to catch was not relevant, being merely an expres-
sion of concern for time.69 Fifth, Mendenhall did
undress when assured she would catch her flight if
the search did not uncover narcotics.70 Finally, the
atmosphere of a DEA office itself was not inher-
ently coercive.
7
Because the lower courts had assumed the initial
stop to be a seizure, the remaining Justices in the
majority72 did not discuss the issue.73 Instead Jus-
tice Powell, writing for the three, also assumed the
stop to be a seizure, and concluded that it had
been reasonable under the fourth amendment. 4
He weighed the public interest in the seizure, i.e.,
stemming the flow of deadly drugs by organized
crime,7 5 the nature and the psychological scope of
josSIIliq of physical abuse, subterfuge, or wholesale
arrests so that by chance a confession will be obtained.
Both the FBI and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs use a consent form in situations like the one
in which Mendenhall found herself. Id. at 535.
0 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1880.
70id.
71 Id. See notes 53 & 69 supra. The fact that, according
to the district court, the respondent had voluntarily
accompanied the agents to the office indicated that the
office was not inherently coercive.
72 Burger, C.J.. Powell and Blackmun, JJ.
73 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1880.
The issue had not been raised below. The concurrence
and the dissent, although dealing with the issue at length,
believed that it should not be decided by the Court. The
issue was raised for the first time in the Brief for Petitioner
at 13-26, United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870.
However, Justice Powell made clear that he did not
necessarily disagree with Justice Stewart's analysis of the
encounter-seizure dichotomy. This was not the proper
time to apply it, nor was he sure that, even under the
standard set out by Justice Stewart, no seizure had
occurred. Id. at 1880 n.l.
74 Id. at 1880. The petitioner claimed that the stop was
reasonable because it was analogous to United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). The government
claimed the facts that led to the reasonable suspicion in
Brignoni-Ponce had counterparts in Mendenhall. The
source city was similar to the characteristics of the area;
respondent's scanning the terminal, flight arrangements,
and nervousness matched the driver's behavior, the ab-
sence of luggage could be considered like the aspects of
the auto, and the factors present fit only a small number
of passengers, unlike in Brignoni-Ponce where all individ-
uals of Mexican heritage were suspect. Brief for Petitioner
at 36-37, United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870.
75 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1881.
"Few problems ... cause greater concern.... [T]he ob-
stacles to detection of illegal conduct [trafficking] may be
unmatched .... "
For a view of the narcotics problem, see W. SEYMOUR,
THE YOUNG DIE QUIETLY: THE NARCOTIC PROBLEM IN
AMERICA (1972).
the intrusion, 76 and the facts relied upon by the
agents in light of their experience." He concluded
that the stop was reasonable and that the agents
had acted on an "articulable suspicion of criminal
activity.
' h a
Justice White's vigorous dissent began by taking
note of the majority's division. According to justice
White, a majority of the Court found that Men-
denhall had been seized, while only three Justices
specifically found the seizure to be reasonable.
7
9
He argued initially that all intrusions are "seizures"
covered by the fourth amendmentas but that even
76 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1881-82.
The scope of the intrusion is a central element of the
analysis. This intrusion was modest. Two plainclothes
agents approached respondent in a public place, identi-
fied themselves, asked to see her identification, but did
not physically restrain her, nor display any weapons. The
initial questioning was brief. "In those circumstances,
[Mendenhall] ... could not reasonably have been
frightened or isolated from assistance." Id.
The Court is concerned with the psychological impact
of the government's intrusion. Fright and anxiety were
important considerations in the auto cases. See Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657; United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557-60; United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-83.
77 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1882.
Justice Powell cited four factors: 1) the agent's knowledge
of the methods used recently by criminals, 2) the char-
acteristics of persons engaged in criminal activity, 3) the
characteristics of the area, and 4) the behavior of the
individual, especially if he appeared to be trying to avoid
police contact. The fact that the respondent appeared
nervous, appeared to be trying to evade detection, got off
the plane last, scanned the area, walked slowly to the
baggage area, failed to claim any luggage, and obtained
a pass for another airline, provided the agents with reason
to stop the respondent. Id'
Justice Powell seemed willing to defer to the agent's
expertise. First, he took cognizance of the fact that they
were trained to observe things that appear innocent to
the untrained. Second, this particular agent had ten years
experience and had been involved in over 100 arrests in
drug related incidents in the past year at the airport.
Finally, the agents are part of a "well defined, effective,
federal law-enforcement program." Id. at 1882-83.
78 Id. at 1883.
79 id.
0 Id. at 1884. The majority and the dissent borrowed
from a footnote in Terry to establish their position. "[T]he
sounder course is to recognize that the fourth amendment
governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon per-
sonal security, and to make the scope of a particular
intrusion in light of all the exigencies of the case a central
element in the analysis of reasonableness." Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. at 18 n.15.
At least one author believes that Adams supports this
view. "Adams recognized that any on the street investi-
gatory stop by the police inevitably involved a restraint
on the citizen's freedom to walk away and therefore is
subject to the fourth amendment's reasonableness re-
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if not all intrusions are seizures this intrusion cer-
tainly was. He carefully pointed out that the gov-
ernment failed to argue below that the stop was
not a seizure, but rather argued that the seizure
was reasonable.8' He believed that Justice Stewart
was wrong to apply a "totality of the circumstances
assessment" to reverse the holding below because
the seizure issue was factually laden and had not
yet been litigated.82
Justice White maintained that even under Stew-
art's test Mendenhall had been seized when
stopped by the agents. The agents, although not
physically restraining Mendenhall nor telling her
she could not leave, would not have allowed her to
leave if she had attempted to do so.83 Justice White
also argued that if evidence was lacking to show
that Mendenhall reasonably believed that she was
not free to leave, that absence was due to the lack
of a hearing.84 Second, the taking of Mendenhall's
driver's license and plane ticket supported a rea-
sonable belief that she was not free to leave.s8
Third, some of Justice Stewart's own examples of
seizures without physical restraint8 could have
provided the basis for a determination that Men-
denhall had been seized. However, due to the
assumption below that the stop was a seizure, these
possibilities were not explored. 7 Finally, he felt
that Justice Stewart, in distinguishing Brown and
the auto cases from the Mendenhall situation, had
confused the issue of seizure with the issue of the
quantum of reasonable suspicion necessary to jus-
tify the seizure.
88
quirement." Caracappa, Terry v. uho and tne rower of
Police to Accost Citizens Absent Probable Cause to Arrest: A
Critical Look at the Pennsylvania Experience, 16 DUOQUESNE L.
REv. 499, 505 (1977-78).
81 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1884 n.1.
MId. at 1884-85.
83 Id. at 1885. The dissent's emphasis seemed to be on
the subjective intent of the officers throughout their
contact with Mendenhall. Conversely, Justice Stewart
emphasized the objective standard of reasonable belief.
Another recent case has focused on the subjective
intent of the officers. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200 (1979); Note, Fourth Amendment-Admissibility of State-
ments Obtained During Illegal Detention, 70 J. GRIM. L. & C.
446, 450 (1979).
s United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1885. No
hearing was held below because both parties assumed
that the stop was a seizure.
8s Id. at 1885 n.3.
m See note 52 & accompanying text supra.
87 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1885 n.4.
See note 52 supra.
" United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1885-86
&n.5.
Holding that there was a seizure, the dissent
concluded that the agents did not have specific
and articulable facts upon which to base a reason-
able suspicion of criminal activity. The only facts
available were obtained by observing the respon-
dent at the airport. 89 Nothing in her behavior
provided a basis for reasonable suspicion.90 If any-
thing, her conduct should have negated any sus-
picion that the agents might have had.a 1 Also, the
dissent was not impressed with Justice Powell's
faith in the success of the DEA plan.9
Finally, the dissent maintained that even if there
was no seizure up to that point, a seizure occurred
when Mendenhall accompanied the agents to the
DEA office. Based upon Dunaway v. New York,53
8' The concurrence relied on more than the facts avail-
able from observing the respondent. Policy considerations
were important to Justice Powell.
9 The dissent maintained that the facts relied upon
for reasonable suspicion were irrelevant. The fact that
Mendenhall came from a source city was not as incrimi-
nating as associating with narcotic addicts, but the latter
does not support a seizure. 100 S. Ct. at 1886 n.8; see
Ybarra v. Illinois, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979). Mendenhall's
failure to pick up any luggage was explained by the flight
change. The agent knew that Mendenhall was switching
flights prior to stopping her, and admitted that he did
not believe the lack of luggage was therefore suspicious.
United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1887 n.9. Nor
would Mendenhall getting off the plane last or walking
slowly provide a basis for reasonable suspicion. Id. at
1886.
91 Id. at 1886-87. The Court had previously recognized,
and reaffirmed as recently as Brown v. Texas, 433 U.S.
47, 52 n.2 (1979), that an experienced police officer
trained in a particular field can recognize suspicious
behavior in conduct that to most people would appear to
be innocent. The dissent believed that likewise there
could be behavior that appeared suspicious to the casual
observer, but should appear innocent to the trained,
experienced agent. United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S.
Ct. at 1887 n.10.
The dissent seemed to be holding the agents to a
higher standard of reasonable suspicion due to their
experience and training. This would be consistent with
the Terry analysis of reasonable inferences drawn in light
of the officer's experience. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27.
9 The dissent noted Justice Powell's reliance on the
success of the DEA program in finding reasonable suspi-
cion. However, to them it was not so clear that the success
of the program was built on "nearly-random" stops. The
success was attributable to numerous factors including:
information from ticket agents, independent police work,
and occasional tips. United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S.
Ct. at 1887 n.l1.
9 442 U.S. 200 (1979). In Dunaway, the Court ruled
that a person who had accompanied the police to the
station house had been seized and that the applicable
standard was probable cause.
The government distinguished Dunaway. Mendenhall
had aroused suspicion, and the agents knew they had to
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Mendenhall's going to the office constituted a sei-
zure akin to an arrest.9 That being the case, prob-
able cause was required before ordering Menden-
hall to the office. Besides, the record did not show
that Mendenhall actually consented to go to the
office, only that sheqid go. Since mere acqui-
escence"5 or an absence f proof of resistance is not
enough to prove consent,r the government did not
carry its burden.
97
Mendenhall's consent to the search of her person
was dealt with in one sentence. All evidence should
have been suppressed because it was tainted by the
previous illegal detainment.98
III. HISTORY OF THE REASONABLE SUSPICION
STANDARD
The authors of each opinion placed the case
within the framework of Terry v. Ohio. In that case
the Court first recognized that the fourth amend-
ment protects citizens from police activity, such as
a stop and frisk, even though such activity is less
intrusive than arrests and searches.99 The reasona-
act quickly or lose the suspect. They approached her in
a public place, asked her a few questions, and then asked
her to the office. This was all very brief. Brief for Peti-
tioner at 58-59, United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct.
1870.
94 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1888.
The government listed four reasons showing that it was
reasonable to ask Mendenhall to accompany the agents
to the DEA office. One was a safety factor-by asking
the respondent to go the DEA office the agents decreased
any danger to themselves and the public from confidants
of the respondent. Another reason was practical-the
conversation was more easily understood away from the
noise. The third reason was important to the future
success of the program. The agents did not want to
attract undue attention to themselves by remaining in
the concourse. Finally, retiring to the office would prevent
unnecessary embarrassment to Mendenhall. Brief for Pe-
titioner at 52, United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct.
1870.
95 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1889.
6 Id. (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 392 U.S. at
548-49).
97 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1889.
9 Id.
99 Prior to Terry, unreasonable search and seizure anal-
ysis was based on arrest, probable cause for arrest, and
warrants based on probable cause. Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. at 207-08.
They [Terry and Sibron v. New York and Peters
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)] were the first cases
in which this Court explicitly recognized the con-
cept of "stop and frisk" and squarely held that
police officers may, under appropriate circum-
stances, stop and frisk persons suspected of criminal
activity even though there is less than probable
cause for an arrest.
bleness of such lesser intrusions is determined by
balancing the societal need for the intrusion with
the severity of the intrusion into the individual's
privacy."° The Court used a two-tier analysis in
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 153 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). See Caracappa, supra note 80, at 506; Miles, From
Terry to Mimms: The Unacknowledged Erosion of Fourth Amend-
ment Protections Surrounding Police Citizen Confrontations, 16
AM. CRIM. L. Rav. 127, 127 (1978); Note, 7 AM.J. CRIM.
L. 385, 387 (1979).
The Terry Court also noted that it was dealing in a
new area of police activity, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at
9-10.
The issue of a temporary detention based on less than
probable cause was posed in a case prior to Terry. See
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 178-79 (1949)
(Burton, J., concurring).
A search warrant on less than probable cause based
on a particularized factual situation was upheld prior to
Terry. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(health and safety inspection of residence); See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (health and safety inspection of
commercial building).
'0o Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21. "[T]here is 'no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by bal-
ancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion
the search [or seizure] entails.'" Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. at 534-35 (brackets in original). The
balancing process weighs three factors: the public interest
in the intrusion, the extent of the intrusion into one's
privacy, and the extent the intrusion advanced the pub-
lic's interest. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 50-51;
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654; United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 555; United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878.
Arguably, the balancing approach that began with
Camara and was adopted by Terry and its progeny is really
no different than the basic analysis of whether probable
cause exists. Probable cause exists when all the factors
are weighed and it is determined that a crime has been
committed and that the suspect more probably than not
was involved.
One author views reasonable suspicion as being no
different in form than probable cause. It is an objective
analysis as is probable cause and will come to be no more
vague than probable cause once it has been interpreted
in a number of cases. The difference between the two
standards may be no more than the degree of probability
that must be present to satisfy each. LaFave, supra note
45, at 68-73. "The permissible grounds for a stop can be
made just as precise as the grounds for arrest; and, the
permissible grounds for a stopping can be set forth in
objective terms." Id. at 84. Probable cause represents a
compromise between preventing crime and insuring in-
dividual privacy. Balancing represents the means to the
compromise. Probable cause has been set as the minimum
standard to justify arrests and searches. Id. at 54, 57. The
Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161
(1924), concluded that the substance of all the definitions
of probable cause was a "reasonable ground for belief in
guilt." This is not much different from a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.
The Court- recently reaffirmed these same sentiments.
19801
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examining police-citizen encounters: first it deter-
mined the justification for the intrusion,' 0 ' then it
determined whether the scope of the intrusion had
exceeded its initial justification.'
0 2
The Terry Court believed it had set out a narrow
exception to the general requirement of probable
cause.'
05 It held that when a law officer has reason
to believe that criminal activity is afoot and that
the person suspected of such activity is armed and
dangerous, then the officer may act to ensure his
and others' safety during the investigation by frisk-
ing the suspect for weapons.'0 ° Terry did not stand
for the proposition that a seizure was justified
based on a reasonable suspicion of any criminal
activity, only on a reasonable suspicion that the
suspect being investigated was armed and danger-OU.05
ous.10
Justice Douglas, the lone dissenter in Terry, did
not view the case as a narrow exception to the
general probable cause requirement, but did hope
that governmental intrusions based on reasonable
suspicion would be limited to the context of violent
crimes.'0 6 He foresaw the specter of totalitarianism
"The familiar threshold standard of probable cause for
Fourth Amendment seizures reflects the benefit of exten-
sive experience accommodating the factors relevant to
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment, and provides relative simplicity and clarity neces-
sary to the implementation of a workable rule." Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U.S. at 213.
101 See text accompanying notes 21 & 22 supra.
'02 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20. "The scope of the
search must be strictly tied to and justified by the circum-
stances which rendered its initiation permissible." Id. at
19.
103 The Court recognized that it stated the question
narrowly. Id. at 15. After balancing the interests the
Court provided officers with "a narrowly drawn author-
ity" to seize weapons without probable cause when the
officer has reason to believe that the individual is armed
and dangerous. Id. at 27. The search was to be limited to
weapons only. After all, that was the basis for the initial
intrusion. Id. at 29. Other cases have mentioned the
limited nature of the Terry search. See Ybarra v. Illinois,
100 S. Ct. at 343; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at
210; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 146, 157 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
'04 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 24, 30.
'05 See note 103 supra.
'
0  Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 151 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Others, too, have maintained that the reason-
able suspicion standard should not be extended beyond
violent crimes. Id. at 151 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at
154 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Three reasons for not extending the standard are
provided by one recent work on search and seizure. One
reason to limit the standard to violent crimes is that the
necessity for immediate action (a factor in the Terry
Court's reasoning) is not as great with minor and nonvi-
in the watering down of the fourth amendment
rights by the "hydraulic pressures" of our time,
symbolized by the abandonment of the strict ap-
plication of probable cause for searches and sei-
zures. 
0 7 In light of the development of the reason-
able suspicion standard and its application in con-
texts other than violent crimes, Justice Douglas'
fears, although possibly overstated, were neither
misplaced nor unfounded.
The use of the reasonable suspicion standard by
the Supreme Court and the lower courts indeed
has gone beyond its expected application.'0s The
case that followed Terry, Adams v. Williams,10 lim-
olent crimes. Second, if investigatory stops are limited to
only violent crimes there will be less public resentment
because it will be easier to see the justification in relation
to violent crimes. Finally, such a limit will decrease the
opportunities for abuse-fishing expeditions for evidence
will be severely restricted. W. LAFAVE, supra note 51, at
27. See Caracappa, supra note 80, at 510.
As the number of stops increases so does the hostility
of the community toward the police. ALI MODEL CODE
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2 at 262 (1975).
107 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 37. Justice Douglas felt
strongly that to move away from probable cause, which
provided certainty and was deeply rooted in our history,
would give the police more power than the magistrate,
leading inevitably to totalitarianism. Such a choice
should be made by the people, not the Court.
Some writers view investigatory seizures as a means of
circumventing probable cause requirements and believe
that the exercise of power unlimited by probable cause
will become the exercise of arbitrary power. See Cara-
cappa, supra note 80, at 527-28. See also Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,
395 (1974) (quoting amicus curiae Brief for NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc. at 56-57, Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1).
10s See note 103 supra.
'09 407 U.S. at 147. A policeman approached the re-
spondent in a high-crime area late at night. Respondent
was seated in a car. The officer asked him to get out of
the car. His response was to roll down the window. When
he did so the officer reached in and grabbed respondent's
gun. The officer acted solely on the tip. He had not
observed any suspicious behavior, nor prior to seizing the
gun had the officer asked to see respondent's permit to
carry a gun (Connecticut allowed the carrying of a
handgun with a permit). Also there was some question as
to the informant's reliability, id. at 156-57 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
The informant's information would not have provided
probable cause for an arrest or search under the reliable-
credible test. The test requires two things. First, a showing
that the informant was reliable in the past is required.
Second, the information provided is required to form the
basis for deciding that defendant is involved in a criminal
activity. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Neither
requirement was met in Adams.
For a general overview of the argument against the
majority's holding, see Miles, supra note 99, at 138-39.
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ited the application of the standard to violent
crimes," but allowed the officer's reasonable sus-
picion to be based solely on an informant's tip.'
Neither officer safety nor violent crimes were
involved in the next group of cases involving stops
of automobiles. In one, the Court required the
border patrol to have a reasonable suspicion that
the car stopped was carrying illegal aliens.1 1 2 In the
next case, not even reasonable suspicion was re-
quired for the border patrol to set up a road block
to check all cars for illegal aliens." 3
The decisions in the lower federal courts provide
other examples of expansion. Like the Supreme
Court, these courts have based decisions to allow
intrusions on general policy considerations rather
than the particularized circumstances of a given
situation." 4 Also, police activity of a less intrusive
nature than a stop and frisk has been approved on
a standard less exacting than reasonable suspi-
cion."
5
"0 The dissent below believed that Adams had enlarged
the Terry mandate from violent, serious crimes to crimes
of possession. See Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38-39
(2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J., dissenting).
1 The officer had no observation from which to draw
in establishing articulable facts or reasonable inferences.
Further, even with the information obtained, the officer
had no reason to believe the suspect was dangerous.
12 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873. The
Court balanced the public's interest in keeping illegal
aliens out of the country because of the economic costs
and social problems they cause, id. at 878, against the
modest intrusion of stopping the vehicle and asking a few
questions, id. at 879-90. Significantly the Court broke
away from the violent crimes limitation; no attempt was
made to justify the stop on that basis.
However, any intrusion that went beyond the initial
questions required probable cause or consent of the in-
dividual. Id. at 882-83.
It has been maintained that Brignoni-Ponce increased
the protection afforded minorities against intrusions on
their privacy. The Court's reasonable suspicion standard
replaced the patrolman's reliance on race as the deter-
mining factor in stopping a vehicle. Van Sicklen; supra
note 40, at 157 n.6.
11 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976). Brigoni-Ponce was distinguished. Id. at 577-60.
For another case where a general concern outweighed
the cases's particularized factual situation, see Pennsyl-
vania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (officer's safety was
the general concern). The Court upheld the authority of
an officer to order the occupants of an auto stopped for
a traffic violation to step out of the car.
14 Miles, supra note 99, at 147 (citing United States v.
Magda, 547 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
878 (1978); In re H.B., 75 N.J. 243, 381 A.2d 759 (1979)).
See Caracappa, supra note 80, at 501; Note, People v.
DeBour: The Power of the Police to Stop and Frisk Citizens, 30
SYRACUSE L. REv. 893, 907 (1979).
15 Miles, supra note 99, at 147 (citing People v. De
Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 325 N.E.2d 562
Recently, however, the Supreme Court's appli-
cation of the reasonable suspicion standard has
had a limiting effect on governmental intrusions.
In Ybarra v. Illinois," 6 the Court failed to find the
necessary reasonable suspicion to allow the frisk of
an individual who happened to be in a bar when
the police, armed with a search warrant for the bar
and bartender, came to search." 7 Similarly, the
standard had a limiting effect in Delaware v.
Prouse,i18 where the Court refused to allow random
stops of automobiles. To make a license or registra-
tion check stop, the officer must have a reasonable
suspicion that there is a license or registration
violation involving the stopped auto." 9
The Court in Dunaway v. New York" 0 gave notice
that the reasonable suspicion standard had not
replaced probable cause in determining the reason-
ableness of every intrusion short of a search or an
arrest. The Court refused to extend the reasonable
suspicion standard to custodial interrogation.
(1976)). See note 114 supra.
16 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979). See Note, Fourth Amendment-
Search of an Individual Pursuant to a Warrant to Search the
Premises, 71 J. CruM. L. & C. 558 (1980).
17 Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent that reasonable
suspicion existed due to the individual's proximity to the
bartender, a suspected drug dealer, the fact that the
police could have feared for their safety, and that a frisk
therefore would have been appropriate. Such a search
would then have supplied probable cause for the officer
to believe that the individual was carrying narcotics.
Alternatively, he maintained that the warrant satisfied
all fourth amendment requirements. 100 S. Ct. at 352.
"8 440 U.S. 650 (1979). See Note, Reasonable Expectations
of Privacy in Automobile Searches, 70 J. CRM. L. & C. 498
(1979).
"1 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. The Court
relied heavily on Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte in
reaching its conclusion, so the outcome is not surprising.
Id. at 656. Also the traffic safety interest was not advanced
to the extent necessary to make this intrusion reasonable
without a reasonable suspicion basis. Id. at 659-60.
This decision actually expanded the privacy afforded
to occupants of vehicles. Although the Brignoni-Ponce
decision four years earlier contained a similar holding,
the Court in that case did not extend it to cover stops
necessary by state and local authorities to enforce state
and local traffic laws. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. at 883 n.8.
The Prouse decision caught many by surprise, but in
1924 the Court laid the foundation by ruling that Pro-
hibition agents could not stop autos at random in the
hope of finding liquor, rather probable cause was re-
quired. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 153-54.
12" 442 U.S. 200 (1979). See Note, supra note 83.
121 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 213. The Dun-
away Court cited Brignoni-Ponce as guidance. The Court
held that probable cause and not reasonable suspicion
should be the standard for custodial seizures for three
reasons. Id. at 216. One, Brignoni noted that only a few
19801
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Finally, in Brown v. Texas"H the Court applied
the reasonable suspicion standard narrowly to the
facts to determine that no reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity existed.iH Based on Ybarra, Prouse,
Dunaway, and Brown the Court appeared to be
moving in the direction of a more conservative
interpretation of the reasonable suspicion standard.
United States v. Mendenhall does not fit such a trend.
IV. THE REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD IN
MENDENHALL
The Mendenhall Court spent much time on the
issue of whether the initial stop was a seizure, even
though seven of the Justices believed that the issue
did not warrant a decision by the Court. 2 4 The
Justices apparently believed that they were staking
out positions on the issue, but upon examination
the actual positions are not clear.
A majority of the Justices appear to accept the
Stewart standard of "a reasonable belief that one
is not free to leave" to be the basis for determining
when a stop constitutes a seizure.12 Justice Stewart,
while asserting that not all stops are seizures, failed
to delineate between informational stops and in-
vestigatory stops. This approach to the seizure
question is simplistic. A situation where a citizen
stopped by an officer would reasonably believe
himself free to turn and walk away, ignoring any
question put to him, is difficult to visualize. Like-
wise, it is unclear how Mendenhall could reasona-
bly have believed she was free to leave and thus
avoid the agent's questions when she was ap-
proached by him and asked for items without
questions would be allowed during a stop based on
reasonable suspicion, otherwise probable cause or consent
was required. Two, Terry was the exception and not the
rule. Three, custodial interrogations were more like ar-
rests than investigatory stops. Id. at 211-12. To apply the
reasonable suspicion standard would cause the exception
to swallow the rule. Id. at 212.
122 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
'23 The Court examined Terry and its progeny, followed
their analysis, and determined that the facts were not
sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for the stop. Even
though the area was a high-crime area, it was late at
night, the police saw the petitioner approach another
man in an alley but avoid him when he saw the police,
and the petitioner refused to give his name to the police.
The Court ruled that suspicion was not reasonable. Id. at
51-52.
124 See note 74 supra.
125 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1877,
1881 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). Although the concur-
rence was not dissatisfied with the standard set forth, it
did not actually accept the standard or apply it in
Mendenhall.
which he would not leave. Although Justice Stew-
art notes that the police have the same right as any
ordinary citizen to ask questions of anyone they
meet, being questioned by a stranger in a public
place is different from being questioned by a
stranger who identifies himself as a federal agent.
The former can be ignored if one desires, but who
can reasonably believe he is free to ignore the
questions of an officer when that officer has made
a point of stopping the individual? Every stop by
an identified officer should constitute a seizure
under the Stewart standard. The officer has used
his authority to restrain the individual's freedom
of action, 126 and the individual could not reasona-
bly believe himself to be free to leave.
Justice Stewart distinquished the auto cases,
maintaining that every pedestrian stopped was not
seized just because the Court had previously held
that every time a vehicle was stopped it was seized.
He believed the intrusion to be greater in the latter
case. The difference in the two situations, however,
is not so obvious. In both, the officer by some show
of authority has halted the movement and re-
stricted the freedom of the detainee1 27 The only
difference is that one detainee is in a car and the
other is on foot. The framers of the fourth amend-
ment surely could not have intended to favor the
driver over the pedestrian.
Justice Stewart also distinquished Brown v. Texas.
126 This is part of Justice Stewart's test. See United
States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
127 There is some doubt regarding one's psychological
ability to voluntarily consent in such a situation. It is a
"sociological reality that most individuals submit to a
police officer's authority." Only one reason is based on a
wish to voluntarily cooperate. Fear of the police and a
belief that noncooperation will lead to arrest are two
other major reasons. See Note, supra note 114, at 901 n.30
(citing L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERO, DE-
TEcTION OF CRIME 17 (1967)).
The Court in Prouse (one of the auto ,cases distin-
guished) gave four reasons for requiring the officer to
have a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation before
stopping the auto. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657.
The four reasons the Court put forth apply equally to
the stop of a pedestrian. The officer has interfered with
one's freedom of movement whether he stops an auto or
a pedestrian. The stop takes the time of both the driver
and the pedestrian. Anxiety over being approached by
an officer occurs in either case, whether one is involved
:n innocent or criminal conduct. Finally, when an officer
pulls an auto over, a show of authority is required. The
same is true for the pedestrian. Lights may not flash nor
sirens screech, but the agent identifies himself as a law
officer. This establishes his authority to stop the individ-
ual and ask him some questions. The identification serves
the purpose of preventing the individual from reacting as
he would normally to a stranger who was pestering him
with questions or intruding upon his privacy.
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The Brown Court viewed the stop of a pedestrian
to ascertain his identity to be a seizure."ss Justice
Stewart believed that no seizure occurred in Brown
until Brown was frisked over his protest. 2s But the
Brown opinion seems to indicate that a seizure
occurred when Brown was stopped. Mendenhall,
too, was stopped for identification. Even though
Mendenhall provided identification and Brown
did not, that would not be a distinguishing factor
on the stop issue. There is no distinguishing feature.
Both were stopped while walking in public places
by officers for identification purposes. If one case
requires reasonable suspicion, should not the other?
The dissent applied Stewart's standard, without
accepting it, to show that no reasonable suspicion
existed,as yet it proposed no alternative standard.
At one point the dissent indicated that all stops of
citizens by the police are seizures.13' However, Jus-
tice White had recognized in Terry that not all
street encounters are seizures.13 2 Whether Justice
White actually meant in Mendenhall that all stops,
or only stops for investigative purposes, constitute
seizures is never explicitly made clear.
What is more puzzling about the dissent is its
view of the standard applicable to the seizure.
Justice White's analysis was based on the reasona-
ble suspicion standard, 133 but he wrote at times as
'28 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 50.
'29 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1878.
'3Id. at 1884-85.
131 Id. at 1884; see note 81 and accompanying text
supra.
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concur-
ring). Also, all four of the dissenters were in the majority
in Dunaway when the Court refused to adopt a "multifac-
tor balancing test" to determine "reasonable police con-
duct under the circumstances" to cover all seizures that
are less intrusive than an arrest. The majority felt that
such a notion, balancing each situation, would destroy
the protections intended by the framers in the fourth
amendment. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 213.
The majority went on to clarify its position against a
sliding scale test. "A single, familiar standard is essential
to guide police officers, who have only limited time and
expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individ-
ual interests involved in the specific circumstances they
confront." Id. at 213-14.
In a concurrence Justice White maintained that the
key to the fourth amendment was not probable cause,
but balancing. "[I]f courts and law enforcement officers
are to have workable rules ... this balancing must in
large part be done on a categorical basis-not on an ad
hoc, case by case fashion by individual police officers."
Id. at 214 (White, J., concurring).
's3 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1887.
The dissent impliedly recognizes the question of a seizure
as an issue. See note 89 supra. If they recognize the issue
then they must not mean that all stops are seizures,
because if all stops are seizures, there would be no issue.
if he were willing to abandon a blanket reasonable
suspicion standard and institute a case-by-case
balancing approach.1a4 The danger of this ap-
proach is that it lowers the requisite factual stan-
dard which separates privacy from intrusion. Not
only would some intrusions require less of a factual
basis, but no consistent standard would govern
intrusions short of a custodial search.135 Each court
hearing a case involving a lesser police intrusion
would have the freedom to set its own standard.
Police would have no standard to govern their
conduct, and citizens would not know what pro-
tections they had until a court ruled on the point.
The Court is faced with a dilemma in determin-
ing when a stop is a seizure. The majority position,
while seeming to give officers more latitude in
dealing with crime, may actually restrict an offi-
cer's options if reasonable suspicion is required
every time an individual submits to official au-
thority by stopping. Conversely, the language used
by the dissent, despite its intent to expand the
protections of the fourth amendment, provides a
basis for opening individual privacy to intrusions
based on less than a reasonable suspicion. 3
The controversy surrounding the fourth amend-
ment centers on the tension between society's need
for effective crime control and an individual's right
to privacy. Borrowing from each of the positions
taken by the Court might provide a beneficial
compromise to this tension-it should establish an
investigational purpose test. The Court should rec-
ognize the difference between stopping an individ-
ual for information to aid an investigation, and
stopping an individual for the purpose of investi-
gating that individual.13 7 The latter clearly is more
intrusive because the individual by his own words
or deeds could incriminate himself, while in the
former case the individual is surrendering infor-
mation that would indirectly benefit him as a
member of society. Whenever an officer stops an
individual to investigate him, rather than to in-
quire about an occurrence or another person, the
officer should be required to have a reasonable
13 See note 89 supra.
ias The dissent relied on the agent's testimony that if
Mendenhall had tried to walk away she would have been
stopped. United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1881
n.12.
13 6 See note 81 supra. "[W]hen the Supreme Court
speaks in a manner that is favorable to the government,
its words will not long remain confined to the context of
the particular case in which they are spoken." Miles,
supra note 99, at 158. Terry is an example. The Court in
Terry did not countenance the extended application of its
ruling. See Caracappa, supra note 80, at 510.
'37 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 13.
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suspicion that the person stopped is involved in
criminal activity. This would protect the individ-
ual's rights regardless of whether that individual
reasonably believes he is or is not free to leave.
Developing an objective standard for distin-
guishing an informational from an investigatory
stop could be difficult. las The Court could solve
the problem by requiring a reasonable suspicion to
exist any time a stop led to the production of
evidence that could be used against the individual
stopped. This requirement seems to coincide with
an individual's reasonable expectation of freedom
from any intrusion that causes divulgence of self-
incriminating information. This standard would
not be based on the officer's subjective intent; the
only relevant fact would be the information or
evidence gained by the stop. This would involve
hindsight, but at least the standard would be based
on the articulable facts and reasonable inferences
known to the officer prior to the stop, and would
thus protect individual privacy.
The Stewart position does not provide this pro-
tection. If an individual does not heed an officer's
approach, but continues on his way, there is no
seizure problem because there has been no intru-
sion. Similarly, if the individual attempts to con-
tinue on his way and the officer acts to stop him,
a seizure has occurred. The problem arises when
the individual stops upon initiation of a conversa-
tion without the officer doing anything other than
identifying himself. Under Justice Stewart's inter-
pretation this is not a seizure, but the officer, by
observing the individual and using information
gained from the conversation, could develop rea-
sonable suspicion to "seize," or even probable cause
to arrest the individual. By merely stopping for an
officer's question, the individual allows his actions
and knowledge to be subjected to a form of
"search" without the officer having to justify the
initial intrusion. Justice Stewart treats this as if the
individual has consented to the "search" by stop-
ping. 139 In light of the psychological bias toward
13 See note 101 supra.
19The fourth amendment requires "that a consent
not be coerced, by explicit or implict means, by implied
threat or covert force. For, no matter how subtly the
coercion is applied, the resulting 'consent' would be no
more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion
against which the Fourth Amendment is directed."
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 228.
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest
and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconsti-
tutional practices get their first footing in that way,
namely, by silent approaches and silent deviations from
legal modes of procedure." Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
stopping when approached by an officer, some
threshold is required to safeguard individual pri-
vacy. The proposed investigational purpose test
would require reasonable suspicion for the officer
to obtain evidence from a person that could ac-
tually be used against him. If, however, the only
information gained was not incriminating, then
reasonable suspicion would not be required for the
stop. The police would retain flexibility in the
information gathering process.
Justice Powell's concurrence focuses more on the
reasonable search and seizure clause of the fourth
amendment than on the Terry reasonable suspicion
standard. 14° Although he did hold that a "reason-
able and articulable suspicion of criminal activity"
existed to justify stopping Mendenhall, he did not
rely solely on the facts known to the agents, nor on
their inferences in reaching his conclusion.14t The
need for a highly trained experienced group of
agents acting within a well-defined plan to limit
the trafficking of deadly drugs was important to
him, indeed overshadowing the particular situa-
tion. 42 Such acquiescence to police skills, although
arguably opening the way for more intrusions, may
in fact better protect the individual from govern-
mental intrusion of a more restrictive nature.1
43
14o See United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1881
(Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell believed Terry
stood for the proposition that a reasonable investigatory
seizure does not offend the fourth amendment.
141 Id. at 1883; see text accompanying notes 76 & 77
s pra.42 Justice Powell was not the first to place an emphasis
on official planning. Planning was recognized in Martinez-
Fuerte as a means of decreasing field officer discretion
which in turn limited the potential for abuse. United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558-60. Brown
placed planning on a par with specific and articulable
facts.
To this end balancing the public interest against
the right to be free from intrusion and to protect
one's reasonable expectation of privacy from arbi-
trary intrusions the Fourth Amendment requires
that a seizure must be based on specific objective
facts indicating that society's legitimate interests
require the seizure of the particular interest, or that
the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the con-
duct of individual officers.
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 51.
'43 Probable cause may in fact be strenghtened by the
adoption of an additional lesser standard. The standard
previously was watered down to encompass a lesser stan-
dard. This watered down standard in turn was applied
to arrests and searches. With establishment of the reason-
able suspicion standard, there would be no need to
diminish the requirements for probable cause. See ALI
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 271-73;
LaFave, supra note 45, at 123-24.
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Justice Powell impliedly establishes two restrictions
in addition to requiring reasonable suspicion: a
major national problem'" and an artfully crafted
plan to solve the problem.
The discussion of the consent issue was anticli-
mactic.145 The majority contended that Menden-
hall had accompanied the agents to their office
and had consented twice to a body search while
being informed that she did not have to consent.
The weakness in the majority position is that the
agents did not inform Mendenhall that she was
free to decline to go to the office. Why did the
agents wait until Mendenhall was in the DEA
office before telling her she could refuse to con-
sent?14 6 It is not clear why the majority should
place so much reliance on Mendenhall being in-
formed that she did not have to consent to the
body search but overlook the lack of informed
consent at the initial stop.'
47
Also, the Court seemed to grant a broad inter-
pretation to what Mendenhall consented to when
she accompanied the agents to the office. The agent
asked her if she was willing to go to the DEA office
for further questioning.'8 He did not ask her if she
would accompany the agents to the office for a
search of her purse and her person. Even if one can
voluntarily consent without knowing that he is free
to refuse, one must surely know first what is being
requested. Yet, the Court accepts as sufficient the
fact that Mendenhall consented merely to accom-
pany the agents.
Finally, Mendenhall represented the first time the
Court had considered the drug courier profile 149 as
'"The Court has been concerned with issues of na-
tional importance: United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S.
Ct. 1873 (1980) (illegal drugs); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 650 (1979) (highway safety); United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (social and economic
costs of illegal aliens); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (crime).
14 The concurrence said nothing separate on the issue.
146 See United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1889
n. 18. "Will you walk into my parlor?" said the spider to
the fly; (You may find you have consented, without ever
knowing why.)"
147 See note 69 and the accompanying text supra.
'48 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1874.
1'9 The drug courier profile is "a loosely formulated list
of characteristics common to persons using airports for
narcotics traffic." United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663,
666 (6th Cir. 1977). Each airport has its own drug courier
profile based on the experience of the DEA agents work-
ing at that particular airport. The profile is constantly
being updated in light of current experience. The basic
purpose of the file is to inform the agent, not substitute
for his own judgment. Petition for Certiorari at 17 n. 17,
United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870.
As of 1977 the Detroit Metropolitan Airport drug
a basis for reasonable suspicion. However, the
probable impact on the lower courts' analysis of
the profile is negligible. The lower courts consist-
ently reject sole reliance on the drug courier profile
as the basis for a justified stop or seizure.'50 They
may continue to do so, because three factors in
Mendenhall minimize the impact of the use of the
courier profile. First, the Court never expressly
stated that matching the profile would constitute
reasonable suspicion. Second, only the concurrence
found the stop to be a seizure requiring reasonable
courier profile included the following characteristics: 1)
use of small denomination currency for ticket purchases,
2) travel to and from major drug centers within a short
period of time, 3) the use of an empty suitcase or no
luggage, 4) nervousness, 5) the use of an alias in purchas-
ing the ticket. United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d at
719-20. In McCaleb the court noted that this profile is not
written down, and it is not made clear to the agents what
combination of these characteristics must be present to
justify a stop. Id. at 719-20.
The profile of the New Orleans airport is made up of:
1) unusual nervousness, 2) limited or no luggage, 3)
carrying a large sum of cash in small denominations, 4)
an itinerary that includes circuitous routes from major
drug source cities, 5) arriving from a source city, 6)
paying for the ticket in small currency, 7) one way tickets,
8) use of an alias, 9) using a false telephone number on
a flight reservation, 10) placing a call immediately on
arrival, 11) travel by a known trafficker. United States v.
Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1978).
At La Guardia in New York City the profile includes:
1) the passenger is not carrying luggage, 2) the passenger
attempts to immediately leave the airport, 3) nervousness,
4) the individual always seems to be checking to see if he
is being followed, 5) the individual is dressed abnormally
for the flight, 6) if the individual does have luggage, the
luggage has no identification tags, 7) individuals travel-
ing together attempt to conceal that fact. United States
v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320, 325 (2d Cir. 1979).
Profiles have been used and accepted in other contexts,
including the detection of airline hijackers, see United
States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Doran, 482 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1973); smuggling,
see United States v. Forbicetta, 484 F.2d 645 (5th Cir.
1973), and auto theft, see State v. Ochan, 112 Ariz. 582,
544 P.2d 1097 (1976).
" See, e.g., United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d at 326;
United States v. Troutman, 590 F.2d 604, 605 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882 (6th Cir.
1978); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d at 916; United
States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d at 720; United States v.
Chamberliss, 425 F. Supp. 1330, 1333 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
United States v. Loyd, 418 F. Supp. 724, 728 (E.D. Mich.
1976). Contra, United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 882 (6th
Cir. 1978) (drug profile relied on to provide reasonable
suspicion to justify stop).
For examples of cases using the drug courier profile in
congruence with other factors, see United States v. Oates,
560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Van Lewis,
556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011
(1978).
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suspicion. 51 Finally and most importantly, the con-
currence relied on more than the drug courier
profile to determine that the seizure was reasona-
ble.15 2 Still, the reasonable suspicion aspect of Jus-
tice Powell's analysis was based on the profile
characteristics.
15 3
In short, United States v. Mendenhall is a step
backward for those who believed that the expansive
interpretation of the reasonable suspicion doctrine
was being curtailed.
V. REID v. GEORGIA
DEA agents at the Atlanta airport observed Reid
arriving early in the morning from Fort Lauder-
dale. A companion deplaned a few persons behind
Reid. Both carried similar shoulder bags. Nei-
ther claimed any luggage, and both continued to
the main lobby of the terminal, where they reu-
nited and left together. An agent approached them
outside the terminal, identified himself as a federal
narcotics agent, and asked to see identification and
airline tickets. He learned that Reid purchased
both tickets, that both suspects had stayed in Fort
Lauderdale only one day, and he observed that
both seemed nervous. The suspects agreed to return
to the terminal and have their bags searched, but
once inside the terminal, Reid tried to run away.
Before agents apprehended him, he abandoned his
shoulder bag. The agent found cocaine in the
bag.1
54
The trial court granted Reid's motion to suppress
based on an illegal seizure.' 55 A Georgia court of
appeals reversed, 15 6 citing Terry v. Ohio and holding
that the stop based on the drug courier profile was
permissible, that Reid consented to return to the
terminal to be searched, and that Reid's attempted
flight provided probable cause to search the aban-
doned bag.1 57 The Supreme Court, per curiam, va-
cated the lower court's order and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
The Court began by explicitly recognizing that
the case belonged under the rubric of Terry.' 54 The
151 Justice Powell also pointed out that reliance on the
drug courier profile did not per se provide reasonable




14 Reid v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 2753 (1980). See note 27
supra.
1 Id. at 2753.
The decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals has
not been reported.
"57 Reid v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. at 2753.
58 Id. All seizures are covered by the fourth amend-
key question was whether the agents had reasona-
ble suspicion that Reid was carrying narcotics. The
Court considered the drug courier profile charac-
teristics relied on by the appellate court, 5 ' but
decided that they did not provide a basis for rea-
sonable suspicion.1'6 Too much of the behavior
relied upon by the agents was innocent. Accepting
such behavior as the basis for stops would allow
virtually random seizures of innocent travelers.6 1
The Court did leave itself an out by noting that
there could be instances where totally innocent
behavior could provide the basis for reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity162
Justice Powell wrote again for a concurrence of
three. 163 He briefly restated the position of Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist on the seizure issue in
Mendenhall.'64 He then recapped the position of the
concurrence in Mendenhall and restated that he was
not necessarily in disagreement with the position
taken by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist in ana-
lyzing the issue.ses He noted that since Mendenhall
did not decide the initial seizure question, and the
Court did not consider the issue in Reid, the ques-
tion remained open, to be decided by the state
courts in light of the Mendenhall decision.'5
ment. Any curtailment of liberty must be supported by
an articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
9 Id. at 2753-54. The petitioner arrived from Fort
Lauderdale, a source city. He arrived early in the morn-
ing. The petitioner and his companion appeared to be
trying to conceal the fact that they were traveling to-
gether. Neither carried more luggage than a shoulder
bag.
'6Id. at 2754. Lower courts have not upheld stups
based on the profile because the behavior which provided
the basis for the agent's reasonable suspicion was con-
sistent with innocent behavior. See, e.g., United States, v.
McCaleb, 552 F.2d at 720.
161 Reid v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. at 2754. The Court
previously has refused to sanction random seizures of
innocent people without a reasonable suspicion. See Del-
aware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 650; United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873.
The government has argued contrary to this position
that a standard of "consistent with innocent behavior" is
actually more severe than reasonable suspicion, probable
cause, and even reasonable doubt. Or, if it means more
consistent with criminal than innocent behavior, then it
is another definition for probable cause. See Petition for
Certiorari at 15 n.15, United States v. Mendenhall, 100
S. Ct. at 1873.
162 Reid v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. at 2754. Neither the
opinion nor Terry, cited to support the view, provide an
example of innocent behavior supporting a reasonable
suspicion.
Burger, C.J., Powell and Blackmun,JJ.
6' Reid v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. at 2754.
6 5 Id. at 2755
'6 Id. This would indicate that at least in the context
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Justice Rehnquist dissented along two lines. He
believed the conduct of the agent in stopping Reid




Reid reaffirmed the application of the standard
of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stops
based on the belief that the individual stopped is
carrying narcotics. The Court again applied the
Terry analysis. It looked to the articulable facts and
the officer's inferences to determine if a basis for
reasonable suspicion existed. The suspicion of crim-
inal activity was not reasonable.
The difference in the decisions in Reid and Men-
denhall is hard to explain. In each case the Court
applied the same Terry analysis to similar facts.
16s
Mendenhall and Reid both arrived in the early
morning from a city known as a major source of
narcotics for the area in which each landed. Both
had stayed only a short time in that city. Neither
picked up any luggage, and both appeared to be
avoiding detection. Both were stopped by agents,
and appeared nervous during the questioning.
Also, both "agreed" to accompany the agents with-
out being told they could decline to do so. Not only
were the facts almost identical, but the same social
concern and the same well-defined plan to deal
with the concern were present. 69
Although the drug courier profile differs17° at
each airport, the Court did not distinguish the
cases based on an inadequacy in the profile of the
Atlanta airport. The profile does not appear to be
the distinguishing factor. Indeed, the Court pro-
vided no distinguishing factor at all between Reid
and Mendenhall. The only Justices to even recognize
Mendenhall were Justice Powell, but only on the
issue of the initial stop, and Justice Rehnquist, who
dissented based on Mendenhall. How could the
Court ignore Mendenhall, a nearly identical case
decided only a month prior to Reid? Based on the
facts, it cannot simply be stated that in Mendenhall
there was a reasonable suspicion and in Reid there
was no reasonable suspicion.171 The Court fails to
come to grips with its inconsistency.
of airport seizures the lower courts are still to draw their
own conclusions about reasonable suspicion and the drug
courier profile.
16 Id. He maintained his position in Mendenhall.
168 Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
169 The per curiam opinion did not go through the same
balancing analysis that Justice Powell had applied in the
concurrence in Mendenhall.
170 See note 150 supra.
171 Justice Powell maintained in Mendenhall that nei-
Actually, labeling the entire Court as inconsist-
ent is not fair. A majority of the Court remained
true to the positions they took in Mendenhall. Justice
Rehnquist continued to believe that no seizure had
occurred. Also, the dissenters in Mendenhall who
could find no reasonable suspicion on those facts
consistently found no reasonable suspicion in Reid.
The baffling change in view came from theJustices
making up the concurrence in both cases, and
Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion in
Mendenhall.
The per curiam opinion assumed that the stop was
a seizure. The investigational purpose test would
have provided the same result, but based on more
than an assumption. The test presumes any stop is
a seizure when it produces evidence that will be
used against the individual stopped. Cocaine found
in the abandoned suitcase was obtained from the
stop of Reid and used to convict him. The stop was
therefore a seizure.
Once it is determined that the stop was a seizure,
the next step is to determine if the seizure was
reasonable. The basis for such a determination is
the articulable facts and reasonable inferences
available to the officer prior to the stop. The Court
concluded on this basis that the agents did not
have reasonable suspicion to seize Reid.
The investigational purpose test does not assume
all stops to be seizures. It protects individual pri-
vacy by requiring reasonable suspicion prior to a
stop which produces evidence used against the
person stopped, and by disallowing its develop-
ment during the stop. The test eliminates invol-
untary "consent" stops without eliminating police
flexibility in information gathering.
Reid and Mendenhall are different in one respect.
Mendenhall "consented" to the search that pro-
duced the evidence, whereas Reid did not consent
to having his bag checked, attempting instead to
escape. Reid's behavior prior to reaching the DEA
office was actually more suspicious than Menden-
hall's. Yet Mendenhall's conviction, rather than
Reid's, was upheld. This highlights Mendenhall's
subsequent consent as the actual distinguishing
factor, but does not clarify the Court's analysis of
reasonable suspicion. If Mendenhall's consent was
the distinguishing feature, then it is no longer clear
that the Court followed the Terry analysis which
requires a decision on the issue of reasonable sus-
picion first. Alternatively if reasonable suspicion
"ther the success of the program nor the profile were
determinative-each case must be decided on its own




was first analyzed, it is questionable whether the
Court relied solely on the facts known to or the
inferences drawn by the arresting officers prior to
the seizure. An examination of those facts and
inferences, consistently conducted, should have re-
sulted in the same holding in both cases.
Reid confirmed post-Mendenhall lower court hold-
ings that drug courier profiles cannot provide rea-
sonable suspicion.1 72 Matching the profile was not
enough to constitute reasonable suspicion. 173 The
lower courts' position also was bolstered by the
Court's recognition that much of the behavior
found in the profile constituted innocent behav-
ior. 174 Reid is thus consistent with previous decisions
abhorring random stops.'
75
Finally, the threshold issue of whether the stop
constituted a seizure was again not addressed by
the Court. 76 Justices Rehnquist and Powell reaf-
firmed without elaboration their positions in Men-
denhall, but the other seven Justices have yet to
speak.
VII. CONCLUSION
Reid seems to reverse the direction of Mendenhall,
if not the case itself. But the per curiam opinion did
not provide enough of the Justices' reasoning to
provide any hints of a trend. In both cases the
Court had the opportunity to distinguish between
a stop and a seizure, if there is a distinction, but
failed to do so. No objective guidelines or criteria
were given to the lower courts to deal with this
crucial threshold issue.177 The Court does not seem
to feel that the issue is ready for determination.'
7 8
172 After Mendenhall it could have been inferred that
the drug courier profile did provide a reasonable suspi-
cion for a stop. At a minimum, relying on the profile was
not er se unreasonable.
1 The same DEA plan and same national drug prob-
lem so important to the concurrence in Mendenhall was
also present in Reid.
174 Reid v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. at 2754.
1
7 5 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 650 (1979); United
States v. Brignoni-Pounce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
176 Reid v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 2752.
177 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20 n.16. "We thus decide
nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of
an investigatory 'seizure' upon less than probable cause
for the purposes of detention and/or interrogation." id.
One writer has listed two ways the lower courts are
distinguishing an encounter from a seizure. One way
attempts to measure the amount of coercion used by the
officer to stop and hold the individual. See, e.g., People v.
DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d
375, (1976). The other requires the examination of both
the amount of force and the purpose of the encounter.
See, e.g., State v. Evans, 16 Or. App. 189, 517 P.2d 1225
(1974); Van Sicklen, supra note 40, at 888 nn.73, 79, 889
n.81.
178 Justice Stevens noted this issue in Mimms.
Justice Powell closed his concurrence in Reid by
inviting the lower courts to take up the issue them-
selves.' 79 The dissent in Mendenhall, which was the
bulk of the per curiam majority in Reid, opened the
way for wide expansion of less demanding justifi-
cations for intrusions other than reasonable suspi-
cion, even while they were applying that stan-
dard.1 o
The role of the drug courier profile also was left
unsettled. The Court cannot expect to curtail un-
reasonable intrusions without providing some guid-
ance as to when the standard of reasonable suspi-
cion has been met.'"' Federal agents learned from
Reid that they cannot always rely on the profile,
but also that innocent behavior can sometimes
support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
In Mendenhall a majority could not reach an agree-
ment on the profile's proper role.
The Court is clear only in its continued accept-
ance of the standard of reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity for lesser intrusions than an arrest
or a search. The standard had not been seriously
questioned since Adams, when Justices Marshall
and Brennan dissented along with Justice Doug-
las. 8 2 Justice Douglas dissented in Terry because he
feared the creation of a broad expansive doctrine.
I am acutely aware that almost every decision of
this Court holding that an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights have been invaded makes law
enforcement somewhat more difficult and hazard-
ous. That, however, is not a sufficient reason for this
Court to reach out to decide every new Fourth
Amendment issue as promptly as possible. In this
area of constitutional adjudication, as in all others,
it is of paramount importance that the Court have
the benefit of differing judicial evaluations of an
issue before it is finally resolved on a nationwide
basis.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 117 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
179 Reid v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. at 2755 (Powell, J.
concurring). The Fifth Circuit has done so. In United
States v. Robinson, No. 79-5252 (5th Cir. Sept. 17, 1980),
it remanded a drug courier profile/airport seizure case in
order to determine at what point the seizure occurred. In
remanding, Judge Randall espoused the same concerns
as this writer in placing a boundary on the evidence
gathered. Id. The Fifth Circuit maintains that a seizure
occurs when the person stopped no longer has reason to
believe, in light of the totality of the circumstances, that
he is free to leave. Id.180 See note 136 & accompanying text supra.
181 "By specifying factors to be considered without
attempting to explain what combination is necessary to
satisfy the test, the Court may actually induce the police
to push its language beyond the intended limits...."
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 891 (Doug-
lasA., concurring in judgment).
ii-See note 106 supra.
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The standard's application has expanded to new
contexts,I83 but in the late 1970s it was not as
broadly interpreted by the Court in those new
contexts. If Reid marks the direction of the Court,
it is a continuation of the recent trend. Mendenhall,
conversely, would represent a reversal. Even
though Reid came after Mendenhall, it did not cite
Mendenhall while dealing with the same factual
situation and refused to find reasonable suspicion.
The fact that the opinion is short and that Menden-
hall was not refuted or distinguished makes it im-
possible to predict the Court's direction."8 Any
time the Court decides two almost identical cases
" The exception is Dunaway v. New York, see note 93
supra.
184 At least one commentator believes the Court is
retreating from the supervision of police activity and
allowing the lower courts to fill the gap. Miller, supra note
99, at 142. See also note 181 supra. This however, was prior
to Ybarra, Prouse, Dunaway, and Brown.
in opposite ways using the same analysis, confusion
is likely to result.
JEFFREY A. CARTER
The options of the police do appear greater today than
they did before Terry.
The continuation of field interrogation as a police
investigative technique depends upon a police will-
ingness to develop policies which carefully distin-
guish field interrogation from clearly illegal street
practices and to take administrative steps to dem-
onstrate that a proper field interrogation program
can be carried out without it leading also to indis-
criminate stopping and searching of persons on the
street. As yet, police have failed to make this kind
of demonstration, and thus today field interrogation
as a police investigative technique remains in jeop-
ardy.
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